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Executive summary
During the COVID-19 crisis, solidarity was a concept 
that was widely referred to by EU decision-makers. It 
was used as a call for cooperation between EU member 
states, and a rhetorical tool to legitimise joint decisions. 
Although it is not the first time solidarity is called upon 
in a moment of crisis, EU solidarity has remained vague 
and ambiguous, as traditional forms of solidarity are 
barely developed in transnational settings. 
While solidarity at the national level can be considered 
‘first-order’, EU solidarity remains ‘second-order’. In 
other words, the quality of solidarity-based relationships 
between European countries and between European 
citizens are poorer than at the national level. 
EU solidarity comes in two forms: interstate solidarity 
between EU member states, and interpersonal solidarity 
between EU citizens. The former is based on either 
reciprocity, or the enlightened self-interest of member 
states which realise that it is in their interest to enter 
solidaristic relationships with other member states. This 
form of solidarity is relatively well-developed at the 
EU level. For instance, the decision over the COVID-19 
recovery package emerged from most member states’ 
recognition that they would all be better off with an 
extensive EU recovery package than if they went their 
own paths. 
However, there is almost no interpersonal solidarity in 
the EU; there are no direct redistributive mechanisms 
between EU institutions and citizens. In addition, EU 
citizens are unlikely to form transnational alliances 
among themselves due to a lack of social ties. 
The emergence of solidarity at the EU level is highly 
dependent on the political context and on the 
willingness of national governments to agree to 
solidarity mechanisms with other European countries. 
The COVID-19 crisis provides good conditions for 
solidarity to emerge, as no single European country is 
responsible for the pandemic, and all are affected by it 
equally. In comparison, the 2010 European debt crisis 
was another story. EU solidarity barely emerged as 
member states pointed fingers more easily, depending 
on national economic situations.  
Solidarity is a core pillar of European cooperation. 
Reversely, a lack of solidarity represents a threat  
to European integration: without solidarity, there is  
no European cohesion and, in turn, more divides 
between European countries and within societies. 
European decision-makers must prioritise solidarity  
in their political agenda and give the concept more 
substance rather than employ it as a mere buzzword.
This Issue Paper presents four recommendations on how 
to foster solidarity in the EU: 
1.  The EU should rethink its concept of solidarity: move 
away from a purely transactional understanding, 
and shift towards a definition that allows for the 
emergence of interpersonal solidarity. 
2.  The EU’s cohesion agenda should be consolidated 
and widened to include interstate and interpersonal 
solidarity mechanisms rather than only inter-
territorial ones. 
3.  The EU should better support national solidarity 
mechanisms as the basis for social cohesion in the 
EU27. 
4.  The EU should establish the conditions necessary  
for interpersonal solidarity to emerge in Europe. 
This Issue Paper, written in the framework of the 
Charlemagne Prize Fellowship and in cooperation with 
the EPC, explores the different forms and dimensions of 
solidarity at the EU level before delving deeper into an 




“Europe will not be made all at once,  
or according to a single plan. It will be 
built through concrete achievements 
which first create a de facto solidarity.”
Robert Schuman Declaration (1950) 
EU SOLIDARITY BEYOND THE COVID-19 CRISIS
In April 2020, a month after COVID-19 was declared a 
global pandemic, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez 
highlighted the importance of solidarity for European 
cooperation: “Without solidarity there can be no 
cohesion, without cohesion there will be disaffection and 
the credibility of the European project will be severely 
damaged.”1 The role of solidarity as a fundamental pillar 
for European cooperation is clear. EU member states 
should find common solutions that benefit everyone 
simultaneously, rather than act as ‘lone wolves’ during a 
global pandemic. 
Indeed, the EU’s role was crucial at this moment of crisis. 
Member states did not have the capacities to raise an 
extensive recovery package individually. Only the EU could 
relax the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) rules and ensure 
a sufficiently flexible fiscal framework that can respond 
to the crisis. The decision to allow all eurozone countries 
to continue borrowing from the European Central Bank’s 
(ECB) purchasing programme at low costs also could 
not have been decided at any other level. In addition, 
the Union’s joint procurement programme for vaccines 
allowed all EU countries to have more negotiation power 
and ensured that all member states – even smaller ones – 
would have equal access to COVID-19 vaccines at roughly 
the same time. Without joint frameworks of cooperation 
at the EU level, Europe’s response to the global pandemic 
would have been less successful.  
The COVID-19 crisis provided good 
conditions for EU solidarity to emerge, 
especially compared to the Union’s crises 
of the past decades.
The COVID-19 crisis provided good conditions for 
EU solidarity to emerge, especially compared to the 
Union’s crises of the past decades. The pandemic was 
an exogenous shock: everyone was affected equally, 
and no government in the EU was responsible for the 
impact of the virus. Due to the nature of the crisis, 
national governments could not invoke the ‘moral hazard’ 
argument to oppose joint EU responses. Compared to the 
2010 European debt crisis, or ‘euro crisis’, the pandemic 
was not related to flaws in the Union’s policies or political 
architecture, as the EU has little to no competences in the 
area of health.
Despite the promising conditions for EU solidarity, 
its reach in the COVID-19 crisis remained limited 
– much more could have been done to mitigate the 
consequences of the pandemic at the Union level. The 
scope of the EU’s response correlates directly with not 
only its lack of competences in certain policy fields but 
also the narrow framework available for EU solidarity. 
The existing EU solidarity mechanisms are of an 
interstate nature, remain highly conditional and depend 
on national governments’ willingness to enter such 
relationships with other EU countries.  
This crisis should be a wake-up call for 
the EU to develop a more substantial 
understanding of EU solidarity.
The COVID-19 crisis will have far-reaching consequences 
on the social fabric and cohesiveness of European 
societies. It is likely to deepen already existing divides 
in the Union between EU member states and regions 
and within national societies. This crisis should be a 
wake-up call for the EU to develop a more substantial 
understanding of EU solidarity. The Union must not only 
focus on short-term emergency solutions but also develop 
more comprehensive instruments to ensure sustainable 
cohesion in the EU. This would bridge the gap between 
the inflationary use of solidarity in political speeches and 
its capacity to deliver concrete policies and initiatives 
that actually foster cohesion. In the long term, this would 
increase the EU’s resilience against future (global) crises.  
This Issue Paper refines the understanding of EU 
solidarity, which is different from national solidarity and 
remains open to multiple interpretations. Nevertheless, 
EU solidarity is real and does exist. The notion of 
EU solidarity should be built on the EU’s existing 
mechanisms, including Cohesion Policy (CP), its social 
dimension, and solidarity in cases of exogenous shocks. 
This Issue Paper explores how the EU could foster 
solidarity in the coming years to fight centrifugal forces 
and ensure the Union’s cohesion. 
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CONCEPTUAL APPROACH 
Solidarity is a widely used social, cultural and political 
concept but has a weak conceptual basis. Political 
theorists are less preoccupied with it than ideas 
like freedom or equality, despite its relevance in the 
development of modern nation-states. However, 
solidarity has become increasingly relevant in the past 
decades because of the erosion of solidarity mechanisms 
at national levels (i.e. welfare systems), which has 
led to more fragmented and unequal societies. In 
addition, governments struggle to deal with increasing 
individualisation and polarisation within societies,  
which also strains social cohesion. 
The conceptual basis for EU solidarity  
is rather weak.
Solidarity has been mostly analysed within more 
developed polities rather than the EU, especially in the 
context of the institutionalised solidarity mechanisms of 
welfare states.2 Consequently, once again, the conceptual 
basis for EU solidarity is rather weak. There is little 
analysis available on the different categories and forms of 
solidarity at the Union level. Most of the research focuses 
on specific moments of solidarity, such as the euro crisis 
(2011-12) or the European migration crisis (2015). 
So far, research has found that EU solidarity is mostly 
transactional. It is based on either reciprocity – member 
states initiate solidaristic relationships in the hope 
that the other will help them in the future if need be 
– or enlightened ‘self-interest’ – joining a solidarity 
mechanism at the Union level advances the country’s 
own interests. EU solidarity is generally defined by an 
understanding that member states should offer assistance 
if another needs support. As such, it is mostly triggered 
in cases of ad hoc exogenous shocks, such as natural 
disasters or terrorist attacks, rather than premised 
on permanent redistributive schemes like welfare 
mechanisms. The latter form is based on another kind of 
solidarity, which is not transactional in nature.
While there are EU mechanisms that could be considered 
‘redistributive’, such as cohesion and structural 
funds, these programmes are not framed as solidarity 
mechanisms. Instead, they are compensation schemes 
for potential losses created by the Single Market, thus 
focusing on the economic aspects of EU policies. This 
framing is due to the perception that the EU’s legitimacy 
in creating a single market is stronger than in the field 
of solidarity, revealing how controversial EU solidarity 
seems to be for many decision-makers and Europeans.  
Empirical political science studies on EU solidarity focus 
on its policy dimensions, as well as public narratives 
and attitudes. However, they fail to define the concept 
in more concrete terms.3 Other studies, such as law or 
sociology, explore the concept via comparative analyses 
of the different EU member states or focus on solidarity in 
particular crises (e.g. migration crisis, euro crisis). There 
is little academic or think tank research on the sources of 
legitimacy for EU solidarity, or how EU solidarity could be 
developed further.
OUTLINE
This Issue Paper contributes to the extensive yet 
incomplete research on EU solidarity by providing an 
overview of the different conceptual notions of solidarity 
in the EU (Chapter 1) before delving into the current 
forms and dimensions of solidarity at the EU level and 
analysing public attitudes (Chapter 2). The author 
also explores the solidarity mechanisms that the EU 
established during the COVID-19 crisis and their limits 
(Chapter 3) and proposes recommendations to foster 
solidarity at the Union level (Chapter 4). 
This Issue Paper is the starting point for further 
research on EU solidarity, under the framework of the 
Charlemagne Prize Fellowship. The Fellowship funds 
young researchers to further debates on the future of 
Europe. The research will continue until the end of 2021, 
exploring the EU’s options for developing its solidarity 
agenda in more detail. 
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Chapter 1: What is solidarity? 
1. A MULTIFACETED CONCEPT
The term solidarity first appeared as a legal concept in 
Roman law; a synonym of a common legal obligation 
(obligatio in solidum). Everyone in the ‘community of 
joint debtors’ was jointly responsible for paying back the 
creditor. To this day, solidarity displays an element of 
joint obligation within a clearly defined community. 
It was only much later that solidarity also developed 
into a political concept, shaped mostly by the French 
Revolution. The idea of fraternité universelle (universal 
fraternity) helped create a basis of legitimacy for the 
new political system. Fraternity helped create social 
cohesion after the loss of the traditional basis of political 
legitimacy, which was based on monarchy and its God-
given sovereignty. 
Since the Romans, three political traditions of 
solidarity emerged in Europe, with different sources  
of legitimacy:4 
1.  The Christian socialist understanding is based 
on caritas, specifically the obligation to ‘love thy 
neighbour’. It originates from Catholic social teaching, 
a doctrine focused on the common good, social justice 
and wealth distribution. 
2.  The liberal-national concept is based on a  
shared identity (e.g. nationality as an ‘artificial 
acquaintance’ of a nation). In the nation-state,  
a joint national identity creates and upholds  
shared feelings of belonging and is the basis for  
the ‘modern’ political community.
3.  The socialist concept was developed by labour 
movements and later institutionalised into the 
welfare state in the 19th and 20th centuries. It is based 
on a shared sense of destiny and a common identity 
as workers uniting to fight for their social rights. 
European social democratic and socialist parties rely 
on this concept of solidarity.
These traditions showcase the vast array of sources of 
legitimacy for solidarity: an opposition to monarchy, 
a lifestyle according to Christian precepts, a means to 
overcome – or at least tame – the excesses of capitalism. 
Depending on the political traditions, the criteria for 
defining solidarity change. Is avowing to a ‘general 
humanity’ enough to create common bonds and social 
ties? Or should they be based on ethnic, religious or 
national identities? Should solidarity be based on 
reciprocity or moral obligations? 
Discussions on solidarity are inevitably linked to 
questions about the social contract, the functioning of 
political systems, and the rules for participating in a 
solidarity-based community. They constantly beg the 
questions of who the actors of solidarity are, what unites 
them, and what they owe to each other.
Solidarity is a highly contested and fragile concept 
because it relies on preconditions that it cannot 
guarantee by itself – a common feeling of belonging, a 
common identity, shared action, or a common belief. In 
that sense, it is similar to modern secularism, suffering 
from the Böckenförde Dilemma: solidarity cannot define 
the conditions upon which it exists; solidarity itself does 
not have the regulatory power to define the criteria of a 
political community.5 
Solidarity is a highly contested and fragile 
concept because it relies on preconditions 
that it cannot guarantee by itself.
The criterion of inclusion is particularly relevant when 
discussing solidarity. In Ancient Greece, women and 
slaves were excluded from solidarity mechanisms. In 
the Third Reich, anyone who did not correspond to the 
state’s ethnic nationalist understanding was brutally 
excluded, persecuted or murdered. Today, the question 
of ‘who belongs’ has taken a new quality in the context 
of increasingly diverse and multicultural societies. While 
political communities always had to cope with varying 
degrees of diversity, the question now is how public 
power should manage it. Is there a breaking point where 
a state and society can no longer cope with an overly 
heterogeneous population because it lacks ‘common 
ground’? In the case of the EU, the heterogeneity of 27 
different political cultures makes it difficult to form a 
common basis for solidarity.
Nevertheless, solidarity plays a crucial role in creating and 
upholding the legitimacy of the state; in sustaining the 
Weberian Legitimitätsglaube,6 or the belief in the state’s 
right to rule beyond its monopoly of violence.7 The EU’s 
contested legitimacy as a polity might be a reason why it 
is difficult for EU solidarity to emerge. Or alternatively, 
because of a lack of solidarity, the EU polity struggles to 
be recognised as legitimate by all European citizens.
As solidarity creates social value for participants of a 
community, it can also be used as an instrument of power. 
Interdependencies and reciprocal relationships influence 
citizens’ and decision-makers’ behaviour. The lack of 
a solidarity mechanism can also be used for political 
purposes. For instance, to exclude certain minorities 
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from decision-making or to avoid the emergence of 
collective power. Finally, solidarity can also be used as an 
anti-political tool to avoid political conflict in the public 
sphere, for non-democratic purposes.8 If a certain type 
of institutionalised solidarity is framed as ‘normatively 
good’, it does not allow for contestation and therefore has 
an authoritarian tendency.9 
As solidarity creates social value for 
participants of a community, it can also  
be used as an instrument of power.
Solidarity has a variety of meanings and political 
traditions. Theories and perceptions have evolved 
alongside social and political developments. Solidarity 
can be legitimised through different means and 
narratives, from a shared identity or a common belief to 
joint action. Knowledge of the different historical facets 
of solidarity can help us pick and choose from various 
concepts to develop EU solidarity further. As solidarity 
is a highly ambiguous and complex political concept, 
understanding its origins and political traditions is 
essential to grasp its potential uses at both national  
and EU levels. 
2.  NATIONAL SOLIDARITY AS FIRST-ORDER 
SOLIDARITY
National identity creates a sense of common destiny 
and belonging in Western democracies. This allowed 
for institutionalised solidarity mechanisms like welfare 
systems. However, solidarity based on a shared identity 
also has its ‘dark sides’, such as the feeling of superiority 
over other nations. Solidarity based on national identity 
therefore has an exclusionary character, defining who 
belongs to the solidarity-based community and who  
does not.
This nationalistic aspect can also be used in arguments 
against strengthening European identity as a basis for 
EU solidarity, as this might repeat the same mistake and 
eventually lead to some form of ‘European nationalism’. 
As the prospect of a joint European identity is still far 
off, it cannot be said whether it would face the same 
challenges and dangers as national identity. It would 
also depend on decision-makers’ instrumentalisation 
of identity as a concept for their political ends. For 
instance, in Poland and Hungary, European identity is 
based on Christian roots exclusively and thus used as a 
justification for anti-immigration policies, even though 
this  contradicts the European values set out in the  
EU Treaties. 
While national identity formed the basis 
for solidarity in 20th century Europe, the 
grounds upon which solidarity relies can 




While national identity formed the basis for solidarity in 
20th century Europe, the grounds upon which solidarity 
relies can shift over time, depending on social and 
economic developments. New forms of belonging and 
commonality can emerge, influencing our understanding 
of solidarity. Such changes in our understanding of 
solidarity have already happened in the past. This also 
means that in the future, European public perceptions  
of solidarity are sure to shift again.  
In The Division of Labour in Society (1893), French 
sociologist Émile Durkheim showcases an important 
shift in the understanding of solidarity, from mechanical 
to organic. Traditional societies were based on the 
former, where there was little individual differentiation: 
“each one’s margin for individual action was close to 
zero and society could only change and act as a whole, 
mechanically.”10 In contrast, modern societies are based 
on organic solidarity, which is not based on similarity 
but rather differences. With the division of labour, the 
sphere of the individual has expanded, as have their 
interdependencies.11 Durkheim’s analysis must be 
read in the context of industrialisation, urbanisation, 
individualisation and democratisation, which led to new 
forms of social bonds. Modern societies define themselves 
through differences rather than kinship.
German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies’ differentiation 
between a ‘community’ and ‘society’ (Gemeinschaft versus 
Gesellschaft; 1887) follows a path similar to Durkheim’s 
to explain the development of new forms of social ties in 
modern and industrialised nation-states. Social ties rely 
on personal interactions and the roles, values and beliefs 
developed in the ‘tribes’ of a community. Meanwhile, in a 
society, they are based on more abstract values and beliefs 
rather than personal interactions. As the basis for social 
ties changes with a community’s evolution into a society, 
the understanding of solidarity also shifts. For instance, 
joint beliefs developed within the community become more 
normative values that are equally valid for all citizens.12 
The institutionalisation of welfare 
mechanisms has made national solidarity 
‘first-order’: national social ties prevail 
over others.
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Durkheim and Tönnies show that the definitions of social 
ties and kinship evolve and change our understanding 
of solidarity. Nevertheless, national solidarity is rather 
unshakeable, as it has been institutionalised via 
redistributive mechanisms, starting in the middle of the 
19th century. Otto von Bismarck, the Minister President 
of Prussia, established several new welfare provisions 
under political pressures from social democrats during his 
mandate from 1873 to 1890. Its heritage is still present 
in Germany today. In the UK, Prime Minister Clement 
Attlee founded the National Health Service after the 
Second World War, which has now become a key element 
of British pride. In France, the État social, based on a 
universal understanding of republican values, is so highly 
regarded by its citizens that they regularly go on the 
streets to defend it. Such institutionalisation of welfare 
mechanisms has made national solidarity ‘first-order’: 
national social ties prevail over others. 
In contrast to this institutional notion, solidarity can also 
be viewed purely in a civil society context. According to 
this understanding, solidarity is seen as a form of shared 
action between social groups. Social movements in the 20th 
century – the labour movement, the women’s liberation 
movement, the civil rights movement – relied on the 
solidarity of their community to fight for equal rights, 
recognition and self-determination. Solidarity is created 
through joint action against an ‘oppressor’ as well as a 
shared sense of ‘communal identity’, not national identity.
Despite historical developments and theories, the main 
framework for solidarity remains the nation-state. In 
this sense, national solidarity is first-order solidarity. 
Meanwhile, EU solidarity is ‘second-order’: less developed 
and not reliant on the same forms of legitimacy. First-
order national solidarity relies on strong social ties, 
shared values and customs, and a high level of public 
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trust. Second-order EU solidarity, on the other hand, 
still relies mostly on reciprocity or the enlightened 
self-interest of EU member states that recognise that 
solidarity is in their own national interest (see Figure 1). 
3.  EU SOLIDARITY AS SECOND-ORDER 
SOLIDARITY
The EU is a ‘Union of states and citizens’, mixing 
intergovernmental and supranational modes of action. 
This sui generis model means that the EU has two 
legitimacy channels: elected governments in the Council 
and direct elections of representatives in the European 
Parliament. Reflecting the Union’s two sources of 
political legitimacy, two forms of solidarity should also be 
present in the EU: solidarity between member states and 
solidarity between citizens. Or, respectively, interstate 
and interpersonal solidarity.  
Two forms of solidarity should also be 
present in the EU: solidarity between 
member states and solidarity between 
citizens. Or, respectively, interstate and 
interpersonal solidarity. 
 
There are several mechanisms related to interstate 
solidarity at the Union level, but almost no interpersonal 
solidarity between citizens, let alone mechanisms. There 
are some solidaristic relations between EU citizens in 
civil society settings, but none that are institutionalised. 
This is problematic, as it means that citizens have no 
opportunities to create bonds beyond national borders 
and cannot create the basis for representative democracy 
at the EU level. One form of solidarity should not trump 
the other, as both are equally important in a Union of 
states and citizens. However, both forms must exist if the 
EU is to remain legitimate in its current form.13 
The EU is a developing political community rather than 
a mature polity. It remains a “family of nations”,14 where 
different countries enter partnerships to coordinate their 
policies. Its political framework is less developed than the 
national, while trans-European social ties between people 
are loose. The grounds for common EU action rely on 
sources of legitimacy different from nation-states. Rather 
than create the same legitimation mechanisms that exist 
at national level, the EU must create a common purpose 
through other means, such as shared political objectives 
and common institutions: “the commonality of purpose 
and the bonds within the new collectivity do not result 
from a common descent, but from shared forward-looking 
objectives and modes of governance”.15  
Despite the relative ‘thinness’ of EU 
solidarity and the predominance of 
national solidarity over EU solidarity, 
conflicts can occur between first-order 
national solidarity and second-order  
EU solidarity.
EU solidarity is based on ties that are looser than in 
national solidarity; it is second-order solidarity. This is 
reflected in the minimal redistributive policies that exist 
at the EU level, as well as the little integrative potential 
of its policies. The EU is known to reduce trade barriers 
and facilitate the movement of capital, goods and 
services (‘negative integration’), but not build cohesion 
policies and extensive new policy areas (‘positive 
integration’). As political scientist Peter Mair puts it,  
“the EU does not engage very extensively in the 
redistribution of resources, except perhaps via the 
structural funds; nor does it even do a great deal towards 
positive integration.”16 The EU’s political system does 
not allow for a broad institutionalisation of solidarity in 
line with the welfare state mechanisms that emerged in 
20th century Europe. Interpersonal solidarity between EU 
citizens is little developed.
EU solidarity has one important advantage: the risk 
that second-order solidarity takes on an exclusionary 
character is less pronounced. As the social ties are 
less developed, second-order solidarity cannot be 
instrumentalised to exclude certain groups from the 
solidarity mechanisms (e.g. prohibiting migrants 
from accessing healthcare on the grounds of lacking 
citizenship). In addition, conditional and reciprocal 
solidarity is in all EU member states’ interests.  
However, due to the current EU decision-making 
procedures and the requirement of unanimity in the 
(European) Council for key decisions, pushing through 
solidarity mechanisms that even one member state  
does not fully support is near impossible. 
Despite the relative ‘thinness’ of EU solidarity and the 
predominance of national solidarity over EU solidarity, 
conflicts can occur between first-order national solidarity 
and second-order EU solidarity. In certain cases, the EU 
has been regarded as an actor that undermines existing 
national solidarity mechanisms, mostly due to its 
liberalisation agenda, while its interpersonal solidarity 
mechanisms are not (yet) developed. For example, when 
one EU citizen uses their right to freedom of movement to 
relocate to a different member state, their access to said 
country’s national solidarity mechanisms (e.g. healthcare, 
social security) can be restricted for some time (i.e. waiting 
periods), or conditional to ‘self-sufficiency requirements’, 




The public fear of ‘benefit tourism’ showcases that certain 
layers of solidarity can contradict each other. In this case, 
European interstate solidarity, which creates the freedom 
of movement for EU citizens, clashes against national 
solidarity, which establishes welfare mechanisms for 
national citizens.17 
Another example is from the euro crisis. Certain decisions 
taken at the EU level had negative consequences for 
national social systems. The Greek government had to 
impose important structural reforms, leading to drastic 
spending cuts in national social provisions to pay back 
debts to its European creditors. In this instance, interstate 
‘solidarity’ within the eurozone clashed with the national 
interpersonal solidarity of the Greek welfare state. 
3.1. Interstate solidarity: Reciprocity and enlightened 
self-interest
The legitimacy of EU solidarity is based on two sources: 
“a rationale based on direct reciprocity (I help the others 
so that they will help me in the future in case of need) 
and a rationale based on enlightened self-interest (I help 
the others because I know that acting in the interest of 
other EU members or in the interests of the EU as a whole 
ultimately serves my own self-interest).”18 Both sources 
can work together, as witnessed in the COVID-19 crisis. 
Member states were fully aware that they could be in a 
similar situation as those most affected by the virus (i.e. 
reciprocity). They also realised that a joint economic 
recovery would be to their benefit (i.e. enlightened self-
interest). EU solidarity is provided because it is in the self-
interest of those involved rather than for higher moral 
ground or a common belonging.
Another example of EU solidarity based on enlightened 
self-interest is CP, where solidarity is driven by the donor 
countries’ conviction that helping recipient countries will 
benefit them in the long run; that there will be a ‘return 
on investment’. Interestingly, the EU does not consider 
CP to be a solidarity mechanism, probably out of fear that 
the public might oppose it if it was framed as such. 
Despite the presence of interstate solidarity between EU 
member states, creating new solidarity mechanisms can 
be difficult as not all 27 member states have national 
interests that would benefit from more EU solidarity. 
Three recent examples are outlined below:
q  While some countries value the concept of solidarity 
in the EU’s migration policy – especially countries of 
first arrival (e.g. Greece, Italy, Spain) as well as countries 
of destination (e.g. Germany, Sweden) –, others are 
thoroughly opposed to this form of solidarity, also due  
to public opinion within their countries.
q  Economic solidarity plays an important role in some 
countries (e.g. Greece, Italy, France, Portugal, Spain), 
while others (e.g. Austria, Finland, Germany, the 
Netherlands) do not share the same understanding  
of economic solidarity. For instance, many citizens 
and political elites in Austria and Germany considered 
the financial help during the euro crisis to be charity. 
However, public opinions were drastically different  
in Greece, Spain and Portugal: the austerity focus of  
the crisis recovery recipe was leading to severe 
economic hardship.19
q  Some member states consider solidarity mostly in 
terms of supporting other countries enduring 
external or internal threats, such as the Baltic 
countries facing Russia, Greece neighbouring Turkey, 
or France and Belgium confronted with homegrown 
jihadi terrorism.
Besides interstate solidarity based on enlightened 
self-interest and reciprocity, other forms emerge on an 
ad hoc basis, depending on the political context. For 
example, in the aftermath of the 2016 Brexit referendum, 
‘deterrence solidarity’ became apparent. Given the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU, solidarity was created between 
the 27 other member states to deter further withdrawal. 
The economic, social and diplomatic consequences of 
leaving the Union became very clear, as did the benefits 
of preserving its unity. This form of unity and deterrence 
solidarity was based on a cost-benefit calculation by the 
remaining EU member states, as the price of leaving the 
Union was clearer than ever. 
The transactional character of interstate 
solidarity has one important downside:  
it makes EU solidarity a fragile construct.
 
 
The transactional character of interstate solidarity – 
whether it be based on the enlightened self-interest of 
a country or reciprocity – has one important downside: 
it makes EU solidarity a fragile construct. Transactional 
solidarity is less stable and sustainable than interpersonal 
solidarity, given that it relies on ad hoc decisions of 
member states to enter a ‘solidaristic agreement’ with other 
countries. The lack of permanent solidarity mechanisms 
at the EU level means that the decision to foster solidarity 
relies almost entirely on national governments and their 
willingness to ‘act in solidarity’. It prohibits establishing 
a more sustainable basis for cooperation, where citizens 
could play a more important role, for example. 
3.2.  Interpersonal solidarity: A limited concept  
in the EU
While interstate solidarity does exist in the EU, 
interpersonal solidarity between EU citizens across 
national borders remains weak. Interpersonal solidarity 
implies that European citizens have a direct link to EU 
institutions and that redistributive mechanisms exist 
between different European citizens. These mechanisms 
would not be based on nationality or even regional 
identity but rather on socio-economic criteria. For 
instance, the EU’s social dimension could count as an 
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interpersonal solidarity mechanism. However, this policy 
field remains extremely limited in scope, as EU social 
policy only supports national welfare mechanisms.
An example of the lack of interpersonal solidarity is the 
EU’s focus on negative integration, such as the reduction 
of trade barriers, market liberalisation and deregulation. 
It has not yet pushed extensively for positive integration, 
which would transfer national competences in policy 
fields like social policy, education and healthcare to the 
EU level. This lack of positive integration complicates 
the Union’s ability to respond to challenges in cohesion, 
inequality and post-COVID-19 fragmentation. 
The deficient interpersonal solidarity  
at EU level reduces the ability of European 
citizens to unite in solidarity beyond their 
national borders.
The deficient interpersonal solidarity at the EU level 
reduces the ability of EU citizens to unite in solidarity 
beyond their national borders. For instance, employees 
in the German digital sector might face the same hurdles 
as those in Italy, Finland or Poland, but do not create 
transnational alliances as they do not consider themselves 
part of the same ‘political cause’. This also limits the EU’s 
ability to strengthen social cohesion across the EU.
The lack of interpersonal solidarity also influences the 
narratives around existing solidarity mechanisms in the 
EU – they are not always understood as such. Even the 
European Commission frames CP as an inter-territorial 
compensation scheme for potential disruptions in 
the Single Market, rather than a typical redistributive 
mechanism based on solidarity.
If interpersonal solidarity has not yet emerged in the EU, 
it is because the conditions to establish stronger social 
ties among citizens do not exist. There are three reasons 
for this shortcoming:
1.  Interpersonal solidarity is based on a joint definition 
of solidarity. There is no such definition that is 
agreed upon across all 27 member states. In France, 
the nation is the unitary factor (nation indivisible), 
based on shared citoyenneté. In Germany, solidarity 
is based on an ethnic nationalist understanding of 
identity, which has never been questioned since the 
Second World War.20 This is visible in Germany’s 
understanding of citizenship, based on jus sanguinis 
(i.e. parents’ national identity) rather than jus soli 
(i.e. birthright) until recently. In other European 
countries, religion or joint action against an 
oppressive regime (e.g. the Solidarnośc trade union 
in Poland) were important national uniting factors. 
These multiple understandings of solidarity in Europe 
make it difficult to establish a joint understanding  
of EU solidarity.
2.  Interpersonal solidarity requires a joint political 
space for citizens to discuss the forms of solidarity 
they would like to see emerge. For now, there are 27 
different political spheres; the EU lacks a political 
community and has no clearly defined demos. The 
EU’s political framework “does not (yet) facilitate 
the evolution of a genuinely transnational space”.21 
Without a strong European public sphere nor any 
transnational political exchange, no joint feeling of 
belonging can emerge across the EU.
3.  The EU’s diverse population and sheer size 
challenge the emergence of interpersonal solidarity. 
Indeed, citizens from one country are more likely to 
enter solidarity-based relations with their neighbours 
than with distant EU citizens.22
However, there are three reasons why interpersonal 
solidarity can and should be developed at the  
European level: 
1.  The EU is suffering from the erosion of national 
solidarity. The social, economic and cultural changes 
of the past decades have challenged solidarity 
mechanisms at the national level. New questions have 
emerged: How to ensure social protection for self-
employed workers in the tech sector? How to define 
the criteria which determine what benefits are given 
to immigrants?  
 
The increasing diversity of the nation’s demos, both in 
cultural and economic terms, paired with a reduction 
of integrative forces, has led to a fragmentation of 
social cohesion. The repercussions reach the Union, 
as many EU policies are not entirely separable from 
the national level and fall under ‘shared competences’. 
The more interpersonal solidarity there is at the EU 
level, the more citizens could also create links across 
national borders rather than recreate the links that 
eroded within their societies. This would strengthen 
European cohesion, as it would be based on links 
between not only national governments but also EU 
citizens.
2.  As global challenges increase, the EU will remain an 
important actor to solve Europe’s joint problems. 
COVID-19 cannot be solved by nation-states alone, as 
the virus does not stop at borders. The climate crisis 
can only be solved via international efforts. The digital 
transformation requires a transnational regulatory 
framework. These challenges can only be tackled 
effectively if EU member states work together within 
the Union’s setting.  
 
The more solidarity there is in the EU, the easier it will 
be to find common solutions considered legitimate 
by most citizens.23 Thus, there is an important link 
between the efficiency of EU decision-making and 
European cohesion. The EU will be the most efficient 
and effective when a strong interpersonal dimension 
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complements interstate solidarity. Interstate 
solidarity will always be based on national interests, 
while interpersonal solidarity is based on a joint 
endeavour between citizens. The latter would make 
European cohesion more sustainable and permanent. 
There is an important link between  
the efficiency of EU decision-making  
and European cohesion.
3.  Interpersonal solidarity is the form of solidarity 
that would make the EU the most sustainable as 
a political system. For now, “there is an imbalance 
between the high degree of European integration, 
together with institutionalised decision-making 
structure, and the relative absence of transnational 
solidarity at this same level.”24 Interpersonal solidarity 
serves as an “inner cement holding together a 
society”;25 “the glue that binds society and prevents it 
from disintegrating”.26 Through this practice of ‘social 
sharing’, EU citizens would create a stronger sense of 
common belonging. 
To conclude, the EU’s second-order solidarity is much 
weaker than national solidarity. Interpersonal solidarity, 
which unites citizens beyond their national borders, 
is almost non-existent in the EU, whereas interstate 
solidarity is much more developed. The latter builds 
on reciprocity, an enlightened self-interest of member 
states, or both.
Before exploring which steps would foster solidarity 
at the EU level, Chapter 2 expands on the theoretical 
analysis in order to delve into the current state of 
solidarity in the EU, in three steps: (i) exploring the 
EU’s current approach of solidarity; (ii) understanding 
the various forms and dimensions of EU solidarity; and 
(iii) studying public attitudes towards solidarity. The 
next chapter outlines the original basis upon which EU 
solidarity was developed, the currently prevalent concept 
of solidarity and the implicated policy areas. It will inform 
the recommendations in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 2: The state of play of solidarity in the EU 
Solidarity is a term used widely in public discourses in 
the EU, especially since the onset of the COVID-19 crisis. 
But what exactly does solidarity in the EU entail? Is it 
mentioned in the EU treaties? Which EU policy areas are 
implicated under solidarity? And is there broad public 
support for EU solidarity? 
1.  CURRENT APPROACH TOWARDS  
EU SOLIDARITY
According to the EU treaties, solidarity has three 
conceptual meanings: it is a value, a principle  
(of cooperation), and a clause.
1.  Solidarity is listed as a value in the preamble of the EU 
treaties, as well as in Article 2 of the Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU). It is also listed in the EU’s 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was initiated by 
the European Convention on Human Rights in 2000 
and enshrined in EU law with the Treaty of Lisbon 
in 2009. This positioning in the treaties suggests 
that solidarity is a core value of the EU. However, 
while there is agreement regarding the existence 
and importance of solidarity, its definition and exact 
application remain ambiguous. Contrary to the rule of 
law, which has been refined further by the European 
Court of Justice, the EU has not yet detailed what the 
value of solidarity means in practice.
2.  Solidarity is also listed as a principle in Article 80 
TEU: the “fair sharing of responsibility, including 
its financial implications, between the Member 
States.” This principle hints at an understanding 
of solidarity as a reciprocal endeavour and basis 
for mutual cooperation. Article 80 TEU explains 
further that “appropriate measures to give effect 
to this principle” can be taken but does not outline 
them explicitly. Does this mean that member states 
should simply pay their fair share to the Multiannual 
Financial Framework (MFF), the EU budget? Or that 
a social Europe should be built, including further 
redistributive mechanisms?
3.  Solidarity is also understood as a clause in Article 
222 TEU: member states should cooperate “in a spirit 
of solidarity” during natural or man-made disasters. 
This clause reads as one of mutual help in exceptional 
situations and an obligation of assistance to a member 
state faced with an important threat. It does not 
encompass an understanding of solidarity that would 
legitimise more permanent solidarity mechanisms.  
 
The treaties’ definition of solidarity 
remains vague, but its broad interpretation 
as a value, principle and clause could be 
widened to encompass more policy fields, 
and to a much broader extent than what 
has been applied in practice until now.
The treaties’ definition of solidarity remains vague, but 
its broad interpretation as a value, principle and clause 
could be widened to encompass more policy fields, and 
to a much broader extent than what has been applied 
in practice until now. While the reciprocity argument 
is present in the treaties, there is no clear incentive for 
interstate solidarity over interpersonal solidarity – which 
opens the door for other forms of solidarity to develop 
at the EU level. The value of solidarity has also not been 
refined further, meaning that it could be understood more 
broadly as a fundamental core of European cooperation. 
In practice, the only form of solidarity that the EU 
promotes is interstate solidarity between member states: 
they must assist others in exceptional circumstances 
when one country is faced with an external threat. In 
this case, solidarity is not a legitimate source for more 
permanent EU mechanisms. The overriding advantage 
of EU solidarity is that it allows member states to pursue 
collective goals that are more ambitious than national 
ones by taking a common risk under a ‘veil of ignorance’. 
The hope is that a country will better defend its interests 
by working with others, rather than having 27 member 
states search for individual solutions.27 Citizen-centred 
interpersonal solidarity, which would take the form of 
redistributive mechanisms, has not yet been developed  
at the Union level.
2.  THE FORMS AND DIMENSIONS OF  
EU SOLIDARITY 
In the EU, solidarity is much less institutionalised than 
at the national level. The most developed form of EU 
solidarity is reciprocal support and mutual help in cases 
of exogenous shocks, as set out in Article 222 TEU. Other 
EU policies – especially CP – as well as the EU’s social 
dimension can be viewed as solidarity mechanisms, 
although there are rarely framed as such. 
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Categorising solidarity is a difficult endeavour, as its 
emergence is highly dependent on political contexts 
and the willingness of member states to engage in 
solidarity mechanisms. Nevertheless, the following 
section lists the different forms and dimensions that EU 
solidarity has taken until now and differentiates between 
institutionalised and ad hoc mechanisms.
2.1. Institutionalised solidarity 
The most developed form of solidarity at the EU level is 
solidarity in cases of exogenous threats. These are 
typically natural or man-made disasters. The EU foresees 
providing mutual aid and assistance through, for instance, 
a civil protection mechanism. This form of solidarity is 
the only one spelt out in the treaties – specifically, under 
the solidarity clause of Article 222 TEU – and is present in 
the only EU initiative that has ‘solidarity’ in its name, the 
EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF). This fund was created as a 
reaction to the severe 2002 Central European floods. Since 
then, it has been used for 80 disasters, including floods, 
forest fires, earthquakes, storms and droughts. 24 member 
states have been supported so far with a total of over €5 
billion. In response to the COVID-19 outbreak, the EUSF’s 
scope was extended to encompass major public health 
emergencies. Italy is by far the largest beneficiary, having 
received more than €3 billion.28 
Secondly, cohesion and regional policy are arguably 
the first ‘tools of solidarity’ developed in the EU. More 
specifically, the first tool instituted at the Union level  
was the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF),  
a financial instrument for alleviating regional imbalances 
within the Community. It was originally a policy of 
solidarity to ensure a common ground of solidarity.29  
The founders of the European integration project 
understood that pooling together sovereignty would 
require a common ground of values, mutual trust, and a 
solidaristic ethos to be successful and long-lasting. This 
led to the creation of intra-territorial solidarity to reduce 
disparities in the development levels across regions and 
foster economic convergence.30 
Since 1975, CP has been developed and expanded further, 
while regional policy now comprises three elements: the 
ERDF, the Cohesion Fund and the European Social Fund. 
The European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund also 
count as structural support. These five funds make up the 
European Structural and Investment Funds and assist 
European regions and sectors, from financial solidarity 
to rural development measures and food programmes for 
people living in deprived regions.31 
Thirdly, the EU’s social dimension can be considered a 
solidarity mechanism, although its scope is limited. In 
the early years of European integration, social measures 
were mostly related to harmonising health and safety 
standards for workers within the Community. In 1974, 
the first step towards a more comprehensive approach 
to social policy was taken with the Social Action 
Programmes. But it was only with the Single European 
Act of 1986 that the social dimension received a more 
prominent role in European integration, and later in 1992 
with the Maastricht Treaty, where the European Social 
Charter was added to the Social Chapter. 
Since then, several attempts have been made to improve 
the EU’s social dimension, but to no avail. The latest 
attempt was taken with the European Pillar of Social 
Rights (EPSR), launched in 2017 in Gothenburg, but the 
principles remained mainly on paper. The Portuguese 
Council Presidency tried to revive it with the Porto Social 
Summit in May 2021 by getting the EU27 to agree to an 
action plan but only achieved limited success. Several 
member states are unwilling to give up sovereignty 
in social policy. For instance, political negotiations to 
establish an EU minimum wage have been complicated, 
as certain Nordic countries fear that more ambitious EU 
social standards will undermine their well-functioning 
national systems based on collective agreements. 
In addition, the linkages between social policies and 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) remain 
weak. The EU has not adequately supported national 
efforts to reduce inequalities and promote cohesion 
among national citizens. For example, “at the inception 
of the [euro crisis], the [ECB] continued to follow 
the ‘one size fits none’ rules of monetary policy that 
had exacerbated (rather than reduced) member-
states’ economic divergences.”32 In the Single Market, 
increasing competition between national economies has 
emerged, with a race to the bottom in terms of labour 
and tax standards. Certain EU policies, such as the 
Posted Workers’ Directive 96/71/EC, also led to ‘social 
dumping’ (e.g. employers using cheaper migrant labour 
rather than hiring domestically). This not only increases 
competitiveness but has also led to a situation in which 
the wage gaps between EU member states are exploited to 
create more profit and not support peoples’ livelihoods. 
The linkages between social policies and 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
remain weak. The EU has not adequately 
supported national efforts to reduce 
inequalities and promote cohesion  
among national citizens.
Overall, progress in social policy is slow and hindered 
by the lack of member states’ political will to commit. EU 
countries do not want to give up their last prerogatives 
of national power – social policies and solidarity 
instruments are among the last ‘bastions’ of sovereign 
competences which remain in their hands. In addition, 
“[s]ome [member states] were simply concerned about the 
effects that the cost of the Community’s social policy may 
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have on the growth, employment, and competitiveness of 
the [member states’] economies as well as the European 
economy in general.”33 
Others doubt that the EU would push for an ambitious 
social agenda if the Union gained more competences 
in the field, mostly due to the Union’s strong economic 
focus and its history of undermining national social 
standards. Due to such political positions that favour 
a ‘market Europe’ and economic integration, as well as 
the reticence of social actors to entrust the EU with the 
objective of developing an ambitious social model, there 
has been no substantial political drive to develop EU 
solidarity – until today. 
2.2. Ad hoc solidarity in crisis moments
In past years, the EU endured several crises which called 
for EU solidarity. The latest example is the COVID-19 
pandemic, during which multiple solidarity mechanisms 
were put into place to respond to the economic 
damage, and coordination in the healthcare sector was 
strengthened (e.g. vaccine procurement). However, the 
solidarity provided by the EU is limited and does not 
always lead to sustainable nor permanent solidarity 
mechanisms. For instance, the euro crisis did not lead  
to a stronger focus on the EMU’s social dimension. 
Whether the Union will be allowed to establish a more 
permanent recovery package after the pandemic is still 
unclear. Thus, while there was EU interstate solidarity 
during crises, that these ad hoc expressions will 
materialise into more permanent forms of solidarity  
at the EU level is not a given. 
Three examples of ad hoc solidarity in past crises that 
deserve special attention are outlined below:
q  Solidarity during the euro crisis (2010) was rather 
weak. The convergence process in the eurozone stopped 
by 2012, and the euro crisis changed it into a process 
of increasing divergence. For instance, Ireland had an 
average growth rate of over 3% and had increased its 
GDP per capita to 112% of the EU15 average by 2012. 
In contrast, Italy grew slower and thus only reached 
85% of the EU15 average of GDP growth per capita.34 
Instead of adding a social dimension to the EMU (by e.g. 
improving the coordination of employment policies, 
adopting social standards, adding an unemployment 
reinsurance scheme) and reinforcing cohesion between 
EU regions, the EU and national governments’ response 
was one of individualising responsibility.  
 
The euro crisis strengthened the internal divide by 
distinguishing between the ‘saints’ who followed the 
SGP rules and the remaining ‘sinners’.35 Whereas the 
cohesion of the eurozone was maintained, the socio-
economic price EU citizens had to pay was enormous. 
Interstate solidarity also suffered, as member states 
that advocated for an austerity agenda were seen as 
lacking solidarity towards those countries that had 
to endure severe reform programmes. At the same 
time, the response from the European troika (i.e. the 
International Monetary Fund, ECB and European 
Commission) towards the latter countries led to their 
citizens’ deep-rooted mistrust of the EU. 
q  During the European migration crisis (2015-16), two 
forms of solidarity would have been required: solidarity 
with refugees and asylum seekers, and interstate 
solidarity with the countries most affected (i.e. 
countries of first arrival, and countries of destination). 
The failure to reform the Dublin Regulation (604/2013), 
which puts the responsibility for migrants and asylum 
seekers on countries of first arrival, showcased 
that many EU countries were unwilling to share 
this burden, largely because of anti-immigrant and 
partly xenophobic national public opinions. Many 
governments decided that their national cohesion 
was more important than EU interstate solidarity and 
solidarity with migrants and refugees. The migration 
crisis showed that EU solidarity is second-order, only 
coming after national considerations. 
q  Solidarity was invoked during the Brexit negotiations 
(2016-20) to preserve the EU’s unity given the UK’s 
withdrawal from the Union. EU solidarity was not 
expressed through policy initiatives or instruments, 
but rather the consistent unity of the ‘remaining 27’ 
in their support for the European Commission’s Task 
Force for Relations with the UK, as well as Ireland, one 
of the countries most affected. EU solidarity was created 
through a deterrence effect, as the disadvantages of 
leaving the Union became clear. Solidarity was also 
created through fear that the UK would divide the EU27, 
which would lead to very high economic costs.
These crises show that solidarity is not a fixed concept; 
it can emerge in particular moments. For instance, no 
one would have expected the EU to launch a joint vaccine 
procurement mechanism before the global pandemic. 
In addition, new policy areas that require novel forms of 
solidarity can also emerge. For example, intergenerational 
justice has become increasingly important in European 
politics as the continent’s demography changes. This 
means that solidarity between age groups should be 
considered in European politics. This new form of 
solidarity is particularly relevant in the context of climate 
change, which is a greater risk to the livelihoods of 
younger generations than their older counterparts.   
These crises show that solidarity is  
not a fixed concept; it can emerge  
in particular moments.
However, crises do not create EU solidarity per se. In 
the euro crisis, for instance, the EU’s ‘fiscal solidarity’ 
undermined ‘welfare solidarity’ in several countries, 
18
especially Greece.36 The migration crisis was also a failure  
of solidarity, in terms of both that with refugees and  
with other member states that struggled with the  
number of arrivals. 
To conclude, various forms of EU solidarity exist: in 
cases of exogenous shocks, the most developed form of 
solidarity in the Union; more permanent mechanisms 
that are not framed as solidarity mechanisms (e.g. 
cohesion and structural funds, the Common Agricultural 
Policy); and the EU’s social dimension, which is 
underdeveloped (see Figure 2). EU solidarity can emerge 
in crises on an ad hoc basis, such as in the form of the 
NextGenerationEU (NGEU), the Commission’s COVID-19 
recovery package. However, solidarity mechanisms can 
also be institutionalised, as in the case of the EU’s CP. 
Finally, solidarity can emerge as a narrative in certain 
crises, such as Brexit or the migration crisis. 
The next section explores public attitudes towards EU 
solidarity, as they impact decision-makers’ willingness 
to foster a more ambitious agenda of solidarity at the 
Union level. While there can be an inconsistency between 
the general readiness of the public to foster solidarity 
at the EU level and opposition to concrete solidarity 
mechanisms, public opinion is a factor that should 
nevertheless be taken into account. 
3. PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS SOLIDARITY
Asked about the drivers of solidarity, EU citizens are clear-
minded: 40% of respondents of a European University 
Institute (EUI) survey believe that solidarity is motivated 
by reciprocity, while 24% believe that EU solidarity is a 
matter of moral obligation.37 Solidarity based on a shared 
identity does not rank as an important driver. The survey’s 
key findings, listed below, reflect the current approach of 
EU solidarity: interstate solidarity based on reciprocity 
rather than interpersonal solidarity based on a joint sense 
of belonging.
q  “Europeans are more prepared to help others deal 
with ‘exogenous’ shocks than with ‘endogenous’ 
problems of the national economy.”38 This explains 
why the rapid joint reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic 
(see Chapter 3) was so different from that of the euro 
crisis. While individual member states could be held 
responsible for their situation in the euro crisis, the 
global pandemic was an external shock for which no 
single EU member state could be held responsible. 
This facilitated national governments’ responses, 
given that national electorates were more inclined to 
accept EU solidarity mechanisms. Public attitudes are 
reflected in decision-makers’ choices: solidarity in 
cases of exogenous shocks, but not when it comes to 
endogenous issues, such as the euro crisis. 
q  EU citizens are not in favour of spending national 
tax revenues on other member states. The 
willingness to share national resources remains very 
low. Allowing the European Commission to take on 
debts to establish a European recovery package, rather 
than create a ‘transfer union’ between the member 
states, thus follows public opinion. 
q  EU citizens’ support for solidarity varies according 
to geography, the issue and the perceived net 
benefit to their respective country. While 75% of 
all respondents support financial help to member 
 Fig. 2 
FORMS AND DIMENSION OF EU SOLIDARITY 




Ad hoc solidarity  
in crisis moments
Value: Article 2 TEU
Principle: Article 80 TEU
Clause: Article 222 TEU
Exogeneous shocks: 
Terrorist attacks, natural 
or man-made disasters
Cohesion policy:  
Regional and structural 
funds, CAP and fisheries







states suffering from a natural disaster and 69% 
for pandemic-stricken countries, only 35% support 
financial assistance to over-indebted governments.39 
The support for ‘debt solidarity’ is much lower across 
all states than for other forms, while net-contributing 
states (e.g. Finland, Germany, the Netherlands) reject it 
entirely. In addition, solidarity is more readily given to 
neighbouring countries than distant member states. 
Further findings from the EUI study could be used as 
grounds to develop EU solidarity in the future: 
q  Citizens seem to prefer a ‘Europe that protects’ over 
a ‘market Europe’.40 Based on the proposal made by 
French President Emmanuel Macron in his Sorbonne 
speech in 2017, where he introduced the concept of a 
‘Europe that protects’, the EU could develop European 
public goods (e.g. infrastructure, health, social policies) 
more ambitiously. Other survey results show strong 
public support for a ‘solidaristic ethos’ in the EU. Asked 
about a metaphor comparing the EU to a house, an 
apartment building, a playground and a sinking ship, 
a relative majority (30.1%) preferred the image of an 
apartment building, followed closely by the playground 
(26.0%), the house (23.8%) and finally the sinking ship 
(20.3%).41 This shows that most Europeans favour close 
cooperation, as both the house and apartment building 
comparisons make up 53.9% of the respondents’ answers.
q  Citizens support more permanent mechanisms of 
solidarity over ad hoc solutions.42 Most respondents 
to the EUI study prefer permanent EU arrangements of 
risk and burden sharing over ad hoc mutual assistance. 
This is an interesting finding, as the EU relies mostly 
on short-term solidarity mechanisms and has put  
little effort into establishing more permanent  
solidarity mechanisms. 
Solidarity as a general concept is much more widespread 
among EU citizens than decision-makers may assume.  
Of course, this does not mean that citizens will agree 
to any broad solidarity mechanism in any crisis – the 
migration and euro crises reveal some clear limits 
to European solidarity. Nevertheless, the EUI survey 
shows an opportunity to develop other forms of EU 
solidarity that exceed its current forms, such as solidarity 
mechanisms that are not necessarily crisis-specific. 
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Chapter 3: EU solidarity in the COVID-19 crisis 
The COVID-19 pandemic reignited a public discourse 
on solidarity in Europe. Solidarity was used as a political 
narrative to achieve the ambitious objectives set by 
decision-makers. It was also a ‘call to action’: at the 
national level, interpersonal solidarity was part of an 
appeal to citizens to legitimise sweeping restrictions in 
public life and border closures. In addition, solidarity with 
medical staff facing incredible hardship was invoked. 
The EU public largely supported the political discourse 
on solidarity. According to an EUI survey, most European 
voters supported pandemic relief programmes and thus 
solidarity in the pandemic.43 
The EU used solidarity widely in two contexts of the crisis. 
For one, to denominate bilateral support and assistance 
between individual EU countries, particularly in 
treating patients, sharing medical supplies and bringing 
home stranded EU citizens (interstate solidarity). For 
another, it was a call for joint EU action and a reason 
to legitimise decisions at the EU level, such as lifting 
state aid rules to increase support for companies or the 
flexible arrangement on fiscal rules (i.e. the crisis-driven 
measures taken by the ECB and in the NGEU recovery 
package). This solidarity concerns European programmes 
explicitly and created an important new function for the 
European Commission to borrow on capital markets. 
The lack of coordination between the  
EU27 led to a patchwork of measures  
from the onset.
 
3.1.  SOLIDARITY MECHANISMS IN THE 
COVID-19 CRISIS
At first, member states had a ‘national reflex’ when 
responding to the COVID-19 crisis in its early phases. 
Several member states resorted to protectionist measures, 
such as banning medical equipment exports to other 
member states. 
The lack of coordination between the EU27 led to a 
patchwork of measures from the onset. For instance, there 
was no coordination on restrictions related to national 
public health measures, which led to a mixed bag of 
rules. In addition, the travel restrictions and regulations 
between member states were unnecessarily complex, 
untransparent and uncoordinated. The EU27 launched 27 
different ‘track and trace’ apps, which were incompatible 
and limited to the country of origin, despite the important 
numbers of EU citizens travelling, working and living in 
other EU countries. Finally, certain EU countries decided 
to resort to unilateral procurement processes of vaccines 
rather than wait for an EU scheme. National vaccination 
strategies were rolled out in every member state, leading 
to a European race on the speed of progress. 
This lack of coordination between national governments 
might be due to the possibility that national decision-
makers underestimated the level of interdependencies 
in Europe and overestimated their powers to fight the 
pandemic effectively. It also gave the wrong impression to 
EU citizens that national measures were protecting them 
while the Union was inefficient and superfluous. Although 
at first member states behaved egotistically, a change in 
their behaviour became evident as soon as the European 
Commission and certain national and EU decision-makers 
started calling on solidarity as “a pivotal idea underlying 
these measures and necessary to solve the crisis.”44 
The EU took several ad hoc initiatives to respond to  
the COVID-19 crisis, specifically in its health and 
economic dimensions. In healthcare, the EU took the 
following steps: 
q  The Commission rapidly issued an implementing 
act to protect the availability of personal protective 
equipment (e.g. face masks). Later, it introduced 
guidelines regarding the supply of medicines. As part 
of its Civil Protection Mechanism, a European stockpile 
of emergency medical equipment was created, called 
rescEU. This was seen as solidarity put into action and 
resulted in the delivery of facemasks to Spain, Italy and 
Croatia and ventilators to the Czech Republic.
q  Despite its limited competence in public health, the 
EU27 collaborated in the joint procurement of vaccines, 
allowing smaller countries to profit from lower vaccine 
prices and more extensive production capacities than 
if they had negotiated alone. This is a clear case of 
solidarity through enlightened self-interest. Member 
states were aware of the potential negative spill-
over effects that would have existed should no joint 
vaccine procurement be put into place: uncoordinated 
competition, political infighting, ‘vaccine nationalism’.45 
q  Even if limited in scale, member states also resorted to 
bilateral solidarity. For instance, stockpiles of medical 
equipment were created, stranded EU citizens were 
relocated via joint repatriation flights, and patients 
were transferred from hotspots (e.g. France, Spain, 
Italy) to other countries with spare capacities (e.g. 
Austria, Luxembourg, Germany). 
To tackle the economic consequences of the COVID-19 
crisis, the EU resorted to the following measures: 
q  The Commission issued temporary state aid rules 
to allow governments to provide liquidity to the EU 
economy, to support citizens and save jobs. It also 
triggered an ‘escape clause’ that allows maximum 
flexibility to the budgetary rules set out in the SGP. 
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Thirdly, the Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks 
in an Emergency (SURE) instrument created liquidity to 
support short-term work programmes.
q  The ECB’s €1,850 billion Pandemic Emergency 
Purchase Programme has been key in upholding the 
eurozone during this crisis, allowing the 19 eurozone 
countries to borrow at lower costs.
q  Most importantly, the EU launched the €750 billion 
recovery package, NGEU. Solidarity for this recovery 
package emerged largely out of the enlightened 
self-interest of EU member states. The economic 
consequences of the crisis would have led to further 
distortions of the Single Market if the EU did not 
intervene, as some countries, such as Germany, were 
able to support their economies more than others. These 
divergences were already visible in the differences in 
national state aid once EU rules were lifted.46 
These EU initiatives and instruments were particularly 
important as the consequences of the COVID-19 crisis 
will be highly asymmetric, depending on the countries’ 
vulnerabilities.47 Not every member state was prepared  
to face a global pandemic; not every national economy 
was resilient enough. Above all, the social cohesion 
within member states was already fragile. 
The exogenous nature of the COVID-19 
crisis allowed the EU to trigger a form  
of solidarity different from that of the  
euro crisis.
The exogenous nature of the crisis allowed the EU to 
trigger a form of solidarity different from that of the euro 
crisis, which was blamed on certain EU countries. No one 
in the EU could be condemned for the virus, and no ‘moral 
hazard’ could be invoked for the solidarity mechanisms 
that were put into place. Calling for more solidarity in 
the fight against the pandemic was politically easier for 
decision-makers. 
In addition, the COVID-19 crisis mostly concerned 
the health dimension, in which the EU has little to no 
competence. Compared to the euro crisis, which was 
also a crisis of faith in the Union’s fiscal and economic 
structure, the pandemic had little to do with the EU’s 
institutional architecture and governance structures. This 
may have also facilitated joint decisions, as the design 
itself of the Union was not contested.
The EU responded to the COVID-19 crisis by triggering 
existing and launching new solidarity mechanisms. Most 
prominently, the NGEU recovery package now allows 
the Commission to borrow money independently of EU 
member states. And the joint procurement programme 
for vaccines granted the EU new competences in a policy 
field that has been largely confined to the national level. 
However, these new solidarity mechanisms triggered 
public contestation, displaying the divides in the EU. The 
mechanisms are also limited in their scope and reach. 
3.2.  THE LIMITS OF THE COVID-19  
SOLIDARITY MECHANISMS
The new EU solidarity mechanisms launched during the 
COVID-19 crisis have triggered contestation: 
q  Between June and July 2020, debates over the recovery 
package – especially the distribution of EU funds and 
the ratio between grants and loans – displayed the rift 
between Southern European countries, which were 
already struggling with lacking competitiveness and 
fragile economies, and the ‘frugals’ which entered the 
crisis with more robust economies. 
q  Similarly, Hungary’s and Poland’s contestation of the 
recovery package at the end of 2020 – specifically, 
a rule-of-law budget conditionality – illustrates the 
division between Eastern and Western Europe on 
democratic standards. While the German Council 
Presidency managed to find a compromise, the 
problem of increasing divergences has not disappeared 
and is likely to remain an issue for European solidarity 
in the future.
q  At the beginning of 2021, the already fragile ‘vaccine 
solidarity’ between EU member states splintered. 
Austria, Denmark and Hungary decided to negotiate 
separate deals to accelerate their vaccine campaigns 
instead of going through the joint EU programme.
Further contestation on COVID-19 solidarity 
mechanisms is likely to emerge on two issues. First, the 
disbursement of financial support provided through the 
NGEU could lead to clashes between EU institutions and 
national governments on how to spend the money and 
what criteria it should follow. The European Parliament 
has already accused Hungary and the Czech Republic of 
cronyism. Second, the Commission will propose several 
new tax mechanisms to pay back the debts it takes on 
through the recovery package (i.e. a financial transaction 
tax, a tax on carbon emissions, a reform of the corporate 
tax base), which will not go uncontested.
Overcoming the divides between Northern and Southern 
Europe will be extremely important to avoid further 
fragmentation between the EU27. Countries that feel 
that they are losing out by staying in the EU are more 
likely to want to leave the Union than the ‘frugals’, 
where citizens’ attachment to the EU is higher.48 For 
instance, in Italy, which was hit particularly hard by the 
crisis, support for EU membership dropped significantly 
during the COVID-19 crisis. In April 2019, 50% of Italian 
respondents of the EUI survey said that they would 
vote to remain in the EU in a hypothetical referendum. 
Exactly a year later, this remain vote decreased to 30%, 
while the leave vote had increased from 25% to 41%.49 
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A successful recovery package is not only crucial for 
Europe’s economic recovery but also for maintaining the 
cohesion and unity of the European project.  
A successful recovery package is not only 
crucial for Europe’s economic recovery  
but also for maintaining the cohesion  
and unity of the European project.
Similarly, overcoming divides between Eastern and 
Western Europe on the rule of law is also crucial. While 
the link between solidarity and values might not always 
be straightforward, without a minimum common 
denominator reflecting basic European values, no 
European solidarity mechanism will be successful. The 
recent conflict over the rule-of-law budget conditionality 
in the 2021-27 MFF and NGEU highlights the need 
for solidarity mechanisms based on a solid ground of 
common values. The Union risks losing further legitimacy 
if EU funds are misused, and EU institutions allow 
authoritarian and/or corrupt decision-makers to violate 
basic principles of cooperation.  
 
While the link between solidarity 
and values might not always be 
straightforward, without a minimum 
common denominator reflecting basic 
European values, no European solidarity 
mechanism will be successful.
Besides the public contestation, the NGEU also has a 
limited scope in the following manners: 
q  The NGEU is an ad hoc instrument between EU 
member states, which implies that it is yet unclear 
whether it will become a more permanent solidarity 
mechanism that persists post-COVID-19. The recovery 
package does not guarantee that EU member states 
will display equal levels of financial solidarity in 
future crises. Instead, its manifestations would depend 
heavily on the preconditions. For instance, in the 
case of a political crisis in the EU in the near future, a 
high level of mistrust between national governments 
stemming from fights over the spending of EU funds 
might make it difficult for solidarity to emerge.
q  A flawed implementation of the NGEU package  
could weaken the EU if, for instance, the financial 
assistance does not live up to its expectations nor 
helps member states bridge this socio-economic 
crisis. Similarly, the size of the recovery package is 
such that it might be insufficient to support member 
states’ recovery. New solidarity mechanisms might 
be needed later, which would be more controversial 
and contested as the immediate urgency of the crisis 
would have already passed.
q  The EU took no measures to support citizens 
individually because of its lack of competences.  
While individual citizens will profit indirectly from  
the EU recovery package, national governments will 
likely take credit. Direct EU support for citizens might 
have improved the Union’s visibility and thus public 
opinion, displaying the positive effect of ‘EU money’  
on people’s lives.
These three caveats should be taken seriously, especially 
as the consequences of the COVID-19 crisis will affect 
social cohesion in the EU significantly. The crisis will 
create more inequalities in and regional divides among 
the EU27. It affects not only people’s health but entire 
livelihoods. Those with freelance jobs, small businesses 
and unstable incomes will suffer from the long-term 
consequences of this crisis. The inequalities will also be 
reflected in other areas, such as education, the ‘digital 
divide’ and housing. This means that at the individual 
level, the ability to protect oneself largely depends on 
socio-economic situations. On a broader scale, existing 
territorial inequalities between EU member states and 
even regions within a member state will be enhanced. 
The COVID-19 crisis is a textbook example of a particular 
crisis leading to progress in the EU integration process, 
as the European Commission was granted a new function 
– the ability to borrow from capital markets on a grand 
scale. However, despite this rather positive development, 
the crisis has also shown that national solidarity continues 
to trump second-order EU solidarity. 
Whether the EU acts in solidarity depends on the nature 
of solidarity invoked, the political context, public 
attitudes and EU competences. As the crisis will have 
long-term consequences, the Union should launch and 
boost initiatives that strengthen solidarity rather than 
merely focus on short-term solutions. Only through more 
long-term solidarity mechanisms will the EU be able to 
forge and strengthen its cohesiveness. 
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Chapter 4: Four policy recommendations to foster 
solidarity in the EU 
To fight the centrifugal forces in the EU, rebuild cohesion 
and counter the increasing inequalities post-COVID-19, 
the EU institutions and member states should widen 
their approach to EU solidarity. In particular, they should 
concentrate on the following four aspects: (i) clarify 
and widen the concept of EU solidarity; (ii) establish a 
comprehensive cohesion agenda which includes both 
interstate and interpersonal solidarity; (iii) strengthen 
national solidarity mechanisms and ensure that no EU 
initiative counteracts national social provisions; and 
(iv) encourage the emergence of solidarity between 
EU citizens by, for instance, investing in mobility and 
exchange programmes. 
 R E CO M M E N DAT I O N 1  CLARIFY AND WIDEN THE 
CONCEPT OF EU SOLIDARITY 
The current notion of EU solidarity (see Chapter 2) is 
too limited given the high degree of integration and 
interdependencies between member states and between 
EU citizens. The limitations will not allow the EU to 
respond appropriately and efficiently to the threat of 
growing inequalities and fragmentations within EU 
societies, which will only be reinforced post-COVID-19.
The increasing complexity of the interlinkages between 
the national, supranational and intergovernmental levels 
does not facilitate the emergence of EU solidarity. The 
blurring of lines might give the impression that member 
states still have the necessary power and tools to respond 
to global crises. However, since the euro crisis, the need 
for systemic solutions has become more obvious. As the 
former President of the European Council and current 
President of the EPC, Herman Van Rompuy,  incessantly 
repeats: “We are all in the same boat.”50 To respond to the 
increasing interdependencies between member states, 
a more cohesive EU is necessary. If the EU is to address 
systemic challenges in the future, the current framing of 
solidarity as interstate reciprocity is insufficient. The EU 
will have to resort to “increasingly demanding principles 
of socio-economic justice.”51 
This could mean, for example, that EU solidarity must 
include interpersonal solidarity mechanisms and direct 
redistributive mechanisms. 
Before establishing new mechanisms, the first step should 
be to develop a broader understanding of solidarity 
in the EU. This could lead to strengthened EU solidarity 
that is not merely based on reciprocity. For this, four 
dimensions will be key:
1.  The EU should develop its own conceptual 
understanding of solidarity and avoid replicating 
national models. In the latter, “solidarity is often 
treated as a form of fellow-feeling that is not readily 
susceptible to rational assessment, akin to those 
emotions or passions that merely overcome us, and for 
which we have no justification.”52 While EU member 
states share cultural and institutional attributes 
shared values and geographical proximity, important 
differences can hinder the development of such a 
“fellow feeling” at the Union level. However, this does 
not mean that EU solidarity cannot be developed. 
Citizen-centred solidarity can be based on other 
grounds, such as collective action or social justice.53 
2.  The EU should initiate a wider debate that 
includes decision-makers and citizens to redefine 
the ‘European social contract’ and the EU’s 
solidaristic ethos. It should cover questions on what 
binds us, what unites us and what ground there is 
for joint action. For now, solidarity remains a vague 
term that is limited to political speeches and does not 
play a major role in the concrete formulation of EU 
policies. To change this, the following steps should  
be considered: 
q  include EU solidarity as a topic of the Conference on 
the Future of Europe (CoFoE);
q  launch a wider EU communications campaign to 
communicate to citizens why more EU solidarity is 
needed to fight polarisation and fragmentation; and
q  national decision-makers better communicating why 
solidarity mechanisms are necessary. “[…] it is not 
easy for government leaders in (self-perceived) net-
contributor states to explain that European solidarity 
today is in in the long-term national interest even if 
it involves short-run costs.”54 Policymakers in net-
recipient member states would have to explain why 
some measures of external discipline might be required 
to reassure donors. 
3.  The EU should explore on what grounds it could 
develop interpersonal solidarity. In view of the EU’s 
nature as a Union of states and citizens, solidarity based 
on forward-looking action and a shared common future 
rather than a ‘European identity’ should be considered. 
The CoFoE could be the first step to better grasping the 
different understandings of solidarity among citizens. 
While crises are ‘stress tests’ for the European project, 
the joint experience of hardship can also be formative 
and unite citizens. The EU should develop and refine 
its understanding of interstate solidarity further. For 
instance, it could explore in which policy areas a more 
sustained interstate solidarity would, in the long 
run, improve policymaking. For instance, increased 
interstate solidarity would support struggling countries 
of first arrivals in terms of migration. 
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4.   The EU should rethink solidarity as a value, giving 
it as much weight as the other values listed in Article 
2 TEU. While they have been taken as a ground for 
further EU initiatives, such as the rule of law and 
the European Democracy Action Plan, the value of 
solidarity has not yet been put into practice. To give 
it a more significant position in the formulation and 
implementation of EU policies, the Union should 
commit to “the search for commonality despite 
diversity, a shared commitment to reciprocity despite 
interest-based divergences, political equality despite 
disparities of power resources, and sober brotherhood 
and fraternalism vis-à-vis different national 
vulnerabilities and needs.”55 Understanding solidarity 
as a fundamental value of the EU is important, as 
there are interlinkages between solidarity and other 
core values such as democracy. The less the EU invests 
in cohesion and solidarity, the more divided the EU27 
will become on other values. 
The less the EU invests in cohesion  
and solidarity, the more divided the  
EU27 will become on other values.
 
 R E CO M M E N DAT I O N 2  ESTABLISH A 
COMPREHENSIVE EU COHESION AGENDA
Given the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU should shift 
its perspective from its current predominant focus on 
economic growth to developing its cohesion portfolio 
further. Rather than following a narrow understanding  
of solidarity that only applies to emergencies, the EU 
could establish more sustainable solidarity mechanisms 
beyond the current focus on crisis-exclusive mutual 
assistance. This could be achieved by, for instance, 
elaborating a much more comprehensive cohesion 
agenda that encompasses both interstate and 
interpersonal solidarity mechanisms. To this end,  
the EU and its member states should concentrate on  
the following actions:
q  A more comprehensive cohesion agenda should 
include reforming and widening the EU’s CP to 
ensure that it is better aligned with the European 
Commission’s current work programme. For now, the 
cohesion and structural funds do not focus much on 
the digital divide or the potential social costs of a green 
transition. While the European Green Deal foresees a 
Just Transition Fund with links to the ERDF and the 
European Social Fund Plus, it is not yet fully integrated 
into CP. The reform of CP within the 2021-27 MFF 
already includes a strengthened link to the European 
Semester and economic governance but is still missing 
the link to the EPSR. In addition, CP does not (yet) 
support civil society in regions that lack a strong  
civic ‘infrastructure’. 
q  The EU should help tackle social fragmentation 
and polarisation at the national level by including 
initiatives in its policymaking that might not be 
automatically considered cohesion policies. This could 
include initiatives that have already been launched, 
such as the EU’s efforts to fight disinformation and 
protect media pluralism. It could also include and 
enhance programmes that support civil society. While 
the EU supports civil society organisations (CSOs) 
through its new Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values 
programme (CERV), it does not support those within 
member states that are not linked to the EU, despite 
their crucial role for national cohesion.
q  The EU should ensure the coherence of the Union’s 
acquis communautaire in its support for social cohesion. 
This could be achieved, for instance, by establishing a 
‘cohesion check’ on EU legislation. The way in which 
new EU directives and regulations impact cohesion 
should become a criterion of the legislative process.  
The EU should ensure the coherence  
of the Union’s acquis communautaire  
in its support for social cohesion.
q  The Union could build on existing EU freedoms to 
improve solidarity among EU citizens at the 
interpersonal level. This could be initiated by 
improving mobility schemes for EU citizens relocating 
to another member state, including better recognition 
of national healthcare and/or pension insurances. The 
EU could also initiate its first direct taxation scheme 
for ‘transnationals’, or citizens who live and work in 
another EU member state. Rather than pay income 
taxes to the new member state of residence, they 
could pay their taxes directly to the EU. While national 
governments are unlikely to support such a direct 
taxation scheme, it would be a legitimate move, as it is 
the EU that facilitates the movement of citizens within 
the Union. This decision would create not only direct 
links between the Commission and EU citizens but also 
a new source of revenue for the EU, as almost 4% of the 
EU population works in a foreign EU member state.56 
If the EU decides to develop a more comprehensive 
cohesion agenda, it would surely encounter opposition 
from several sides. National governments would 
suspect that the EU is gaining more competences;57 
civil society and citizens might fear a further erosion of 
national social standards; and some even within the EU 
institutions might say that the EU treaties do not provide 
the required legal basis for such an agenda. Certain 
political parties and decision-makers would be opposed 
because such an agenda diverts the political direction of 
the EU away from its traditional priorities on the Single 
Market (e.g. competitiveness, growth, liberalisation). 
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However, surveys show that the EU has the public support 
for more permanent solidarity mechanisms and a ‘Europe 
that protects’. Therefore, a broad alliance of national 
and European actors – political parties, CSOs, national 
governments – should attempt to put cohesion and 
solidarity at the helm of the EU agenda. 
 
The EU has the public support for more 
permanent solidarity mechanisms and a 
‘Europe that protects’. Therefore, a broad 
alliance of national and European actors 
should attempt to put cohesion and 
solidarity at the helm of the EU agenda.
National decision-makers should also consider EU 
solidarity in the long term rather than focus on short-
term electoral gains for their respective electorates. 
Public opinion shifts rapidly depending on the political 
context, and EU citizens might become more supportive 
of the Union if it decides to be more ambitious in the 
fields of cohesion and solidarity. Currently, most citizens 
expect a reciprocal benefit from EU solidarity. But this 
could change if the EU develops more direct solidarity 
mechanisms, such as a tax system for ‘transnationals’, 
or supports welfare policies more visibly.58 These efforts 
would, over time, contribute to the development of 
interpersonal solidarity and have two positive effects: the 
EU would respond to global challenges more effectively, 
as more cohesive societies would ensure that there is 
stronger support for EU action; and the Union’s legitimacy 
would be increased in the eyes of EU citizens.
 R E CO M M E N DAT I O N 3  STRENGTHEN NATIONAL 
SOLIDARITY MECHANISMS
The EU is faced with a double challenge. Not only are the 
EU member states fragmented, but the social cohesion 
within national societies is also threatened. The success 
of European policies depends heavily on the quality of 
cohesion within the EU27. If the Union is to establish 
more sustainable and resilient solidarity mechanisms, it 
must support efforts to strengthen national cohesion.  
If the Union is to establish more 
sustainable and resilient solidarity 
mechanisms, it must support efforts  
to strengthen national cohesion.
In the past, the EU undermined certain solidarity 
mechanisms at the national level through policies of 
fiscal discipline and budget consolidation. This mistake 
should not be repeated under any circumstances. Such 
measures that were forced upon the member states 
in the context of the euro crisis hurt citizens’ salaries, 
pensions and welfare provisions. The austerity policies 
led to a degradation of several EU countries’ cohesion 
and citizens’ living conditions. The obvious example was 
Greece, which was obliged to accept spending cuts in 
return for a troika bail-out. Of course, Greece might not 
have been able to uphold its welfare provisions if it had 
lost access to financial markets. However, the EU should 
have ensured an economic recovery of Greece that did 
not entail cutting national public services so drastically. 
These decisions ultimately undermined the EU’s 
legitimacy, as Southern European populations became 
much more critical towards the EU after the euro crisis.59
To avoid repeating past mistakes, the EU should take the 
following measures:
q  Ensure that the COVID-19 recovery process is 
not focused on budget consolidation and fiscal 
discipline. Instead, the EU should support member 
states’ social contracts and their social dimension. 
While the COVID-19 recovery package includes  
criteria for green and digital investments, it does not 
provide any to ensure that national social services 
are not cut due to insufficient funding caused by an 
economic recession.60
q  Incentivise national governments to implement 
ambitious national solidarity policies by, for 
example, linking EU funds to social criteria. For 
instance, the EU could introduce a ‘non-regression 
clause’ to ensure that national governments do 
not cut their spending on welfare provisions post-
COVID-19. This would ensure that all member states 
prioritise social protection and focus on policies like 
infrastructure, healthcare and education.
q  Develop European public goods further through 
targeted investments – particularly in transport, 
energy, education and healthcare – to support national 
governments’ ability to provide public services. The 
EU should also establish minimum social standards 
and ensure their implementation in practice, including 
applying the EPSR.61
q  Decipher more systematically what areas of social 
policies are not yet well-developed across the 
EU27, then provide EU-wide solutions. For example, 
the European digital workforce is barely protected 
by national provisions. The EU is already attempting 
to tackle the digital skills gap by supporting national 
mechanisms through programmes like the European 
Skills Agenda and the Digital Education Action Plan, 
but their scope remains limited. The EU could also 
create a status for European freelancers, who are barely 
covered by national social provisions. 
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 R E CO M M E N DAT I O N 4  MOVE TOWARDS 
INTERPERSONAL SOLIDARITY 
Those opposed to a more ambitious European solidarity 
agenda might argue that the Union’s ‘democratic 
deficit’ should first be solved before the EU takes on 
further competences. However, this argument is mostly 
used to block or delay progress, despite the urgency of 
strengthening solidarity in view of future challenges. 
Solidarity should not be reserved to mature political 
systems built on a strong political community, demos 
or common identity. Solidarity should be put into 
place when political circumstances call for it, 
social provisions are insufficient, or the economic 
integration creates divergences that need to be 
tackled. EU solidarity becomes even more relevant 
when the social ties at the national level are increasingly 
contested, and national solidarity mechanisms are not 
as solid and comprehensive as they were in the past. 
The Union should not wait to reform its institutional 
architecture fundamentally to foster EU solidarity. 
The Union should not wait to reform  
its institutional architecture to foster  
EU solidarity.
In addition, developing a more ambitious solidarity 
agenda at the EU level should not be stymied by national 
governments that do not wish to see the EU develop such 
a solidarity agenda. It is unlikely that the EU27 will move 
forward on developing EU solidarity – especially at the 
interpersonal level – when there are significant divides 
at the European level, in terms of both democratic values 
and socio-economic fragmentations. The heterogeneity 
of the EU27 and its growing divides in terms of values are 
too significant to realistically expect unified progress.  
While differentiated integration always 
bears the risk of further fragmentation, 
not moving forward at all would be more 
dangerous than moving forward with only 
a few EU member states.
The countries willing to push for an ambitious 
EU solidarity agenda should use the method of 
enhanced cooperation. This instrument could help foster 
interpersonal solidarity mechanisms by, for instance, 
establishing new redistributive mechanisms at the EU level 
(see Recommendation 2). In case this method does not 
work – it requires a minimum of nine member states –,  
the willing countries should also consider possible 
cooperation outside of EU treaties, as was initially the case 
for the Schengen area. While differentiated integration 
always bears the risk of further fragmentation, not moving 
forward at all would be more dangerous than moving 
forward with only a few EU member states. And those 
wishing to join the ‘solidarity club’ could always do so at  
a later stage.  
While differentiated integration always 
bears the risk of further fragmentation, 
not moving forward at all would be more 
dangerous than moving forward with only 
a few EU member states.
While moving forward with a solidarity agenda should 
not first require a reform of the EU’s institutional 
architecture, establishing new solidarity mechanisms – 
especially at the interpersonal level – will require certain 
changes to the Union’s political system over time. First 
and foremost, the disconnect between EU citizens 
and EU institutions should be closed. To achieve 
this objective, the EU and its member states should 
concentrate on the following actions:
q  The EU should make EU citizenship more 
meaningful without necessarily creating a European 
identity. This could be achieved by (i) facilitating the 
political engagement of citizens living in foreign EU 
countries; (ii) fostering the role and increasing the 
powers of European political parties to better represent 
European citizens politically; and (iii) ensuring that 
all national citizenship laws are compatible with the 
values that underpin EU citizenship.
q  The EU should invest in programmes that create 
stronger social ties between its citizens, laying the 
grounds for higher levels of interpersonal solidarity. 
In the long run, citizens would self-identify through 
features other than their nationality, like employers, 
tourists, consumers, or mobile citizens in the Schengen 
area. This could be achieved by ensuring that CSOs 
representing those ‘identity features’ (e.g. trade unions, 
consumer associations) have much stronger links with 
EU countries, share resources and coordinate between 
themselves. This could be incentivised in, for instance, 
the existing programmes for civil society, such as the 
new CERV programme. ‘Europeanising’ CSOs would 
also contribute to a better representation of citizens at 
the EU level; an avenue which has not been sufficiently 
explored yet.62
q  The EU should enhance investments in policy 
fields that foster mutual understanding and 
cooperation not only among EU citizens but also 
between member states bilaterally. For instance, 
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the Union could invest more substantial resources 
in cross-border, bilateral exchanges and mobility 
programmes, such as the DiscoverEU programme. It 
should also ensure that these programmes are used 
more widely by facilitating their access and investing 
in communication campaigns, as many citizens are not 
aware of those opportunities. In addition, while the 
Erasmus+ exchange programme has been widened to 
include non-academic studies and apprenticeships, it 
is not exploited to its fullest potential as there are too 
many hurdles in the application process, a widespread 
lack of knowledge about the programme, and a lack of 
resources for applicants.  
 
These fields are often seen as less important than 
economic or trade policy. However, investing in cross-
border and citizen-centred programmes should be 
a priority if the EU is to ensure a broad legitimacy 
for further integration processes in policy areas that 
remain largely national competences, such as health.
q  The EU should develop democratic spaces further so 
that citizens can debate across borders. To achieve 
this aim, the EU should invest in a more integrated 
European civic and public sphere. It could invest 
in new technologies that improve interpersonal 
communications. The new opportunities to improve 
exchanges emerging from the digital transformation 
have not yet been used to their full potential. 
Strengthening deliberative formats and participatory 
democracy is another avenue that could ensure better 
links between EU citizens, and between EU citizens and 
EU institutions. For instance, the EU could establish 
a permanent European citizens’ assembly which also 
discusses issues of solidarity, to be institutionalised 
after the CoFoE.  
The EU could establish a permanent 
European citizens’ assembly which  
also discusses issues of solidarity,  
to be institutionalised after the CoFoE.
q  The EU should incentivise the Europeanisation of 
national public spheres by, for instance, proposing 
regular training on the EU for national journalists; and 
fostering exchanges between national parliamentarians. 
The Union should also have a more ambitious 
communications strategy to increase its visibility in 
national public spheres. Additionally, national political 
parties should ensure that their European political 
families are much more visible during the European 
election campaigns. The process of Europeanising 
national public spheres will take time and not be 
straightforward. Nevertheless, it will be indispensable  
to the EU’s wish to become more cohesive.
By following those broad recommendations, the EU 
could foster solidarity in the long run, far beyond ad 
hoc mechanisms put into place during crises like the 
COVID-19 pandemic. In view of Europe’s multiple crises 
of the past decade – and considering the repercussions 
of the more recent pandemic –, investing in solidarity 
cohesion should be a top priority for the EU. 
28
Conclusion 
Fostering EU solidarity will not be easy. It will be a 
highly contested, long and tedious process. However, 
the COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the necessity for 
solidarity: inequalities will continue to surge in and 
among societies, while the risk for further fragmentation 
between the EU27 is high. If the EU is to prevent divides 
from deepening, both politically and socio-economically, 
it should avoid going back to ‘business as usual’ after the 
crisis. Instead, a changed EU rationale towards solidarity 
would allow us to shift from the current use of solidarity 
as a mere buzzword towards an applicable political 
concept that fights the disintegrative forces in the EU.
The Union and its member states should widen their 
understanding of solidarity and emphasise it as a core 
value of EU cooperation. The EU should also explore 
its capacity to consolidate its existing solidarity 
mechanisms and develop a more comprehensive cohesion 
agenda. Finally, the EU should provide the conditions 
for interpersonal solidarity to emerge. Only if the EU 
manages to consolidate its inner core will it be able to 
face future challenges.
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